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Itai Grinberg
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
ANONYMOUS WITHHOLDING AGREEMENTS AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN TAXING FOREIGN FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS
Testimony before the Finance Committee of the German Bundestag
24 September 2012
Good afternoon, Chairwoman Reinemund and members of the Finance Committee.
My name is Itai Grinberg, and I am an Associate Professor of Law at Georgetown
University Law Center. 1 Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
about the Swiss-German anonymous tax withholding agreement. In my testimony, I
will make three key points:

I.

•

Automatic information exchange is superior to anonymous withholding
for the purpose of combating tax evasion involving the use of foreign
financial accounts.

•

German ratification of the Swiss-German anonymous tax withholding
agreement would stifle the emergence of a multilateral automatic
information exchange system. As a result, Germany would be less able
to address its own concerns with tax evasion through foreign accounts
over the medium term. By ratifying this agreement, Germany would
also slow the development of a multilateral system that would allow
many other countries around the world to effectively address their
concerns with tax evasion through foreign accounts.

•

Switzerland has in effect agreed to automatic information exchange with
the United States. Germany could pressure Switzerland unilaterally,
multilaterally, and through the EU for a similar agreement.

The Future of the Taxation of Foreign Financial Accounts

The international tax system is in the midst of a battle between automatic information
reporting and anonymous withholding models for ensuring that nations can tax the
foreign financial accounts 2 of their residents. 3 At stake is the extent of many countries’
capacity to impose an income tax on the investment income of individuals and the
profits of closely held businesses in a world that is increasingly financially integrated.
New approaches to enhanced cross-border tax cooperation based on automatic
information exchange are currently being developed in three separate but related
projects. These projects are being led respectively by the Organisation for Economic
1

Until the summer of 2011, I served in the Office of International Tax Counsel at the United States Department of
the Treasury. In that capacity I was involved in the Obama Administration’s legislative, regulatory, and diplomatic
efforts to address offshore tax evasion. The views I express in this submission to the Finance Committee of the
German Bundestag are solely my own.
2
I use the term “foreign financial account” to refer to any account that is owned or controlled by an individual
investor who is not tax resident in the jurisdiction where the financial institution (or the relevant subsidiary or branch
of such institution) that provides the account is located.
3
My views on the battle between automatic information reporting and anonymous withholding are laid out in much
greater detail in two related papers. The more recent of these papers is entitled The Battle Over Taxing Offshore
Accounts (forthcoming in the UCLA Law Review; available at http://www.uclalawreview.org/?p=3814). An earlier
version of that paper, released in January 2012, is entitled Beyond FATCA: An Evolutionary Moment for the
International Tax System, and is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996752.
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Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EU, and the United States in partnership
with some of its major European trading partners, including Germany. Separately,
Switzerland is promoting an anonymous withholding approach for addressing the
question of foreign financial accounts. Both the automatic information exchange
approach and the anonymous withholding approach are built on the premise that
financial institutions should act as cross-border tax intermediaries. The debate around
international tax cooperation has thus shifted from a dispute about whether financial
institutions should function as cross-border tax intermediaries to a dispute about how
financial institutions should perform that role and for which jurisdictions they should
do so. This development represents a remarkable shift in international norms.
However, a great deal is at stake in the decision either to focus exclusively on the
automatic information exchange practices being promoted by the OECD, the EU, and
the United States and its partners, or to accept the anonymous withholding alternative
that Switzerland is promoting. The triumph of the automatic information reporting
model over the anonymous withholding model is important for several reasons: (1) it
allows for the taxation of principal, (2) it helps maintain taxpayers’ sense of fairness,
and (3) it makes possible the emergence of a multilateral system in which financial
institutions serve as cross-border tax intermediaries regardless of the jurisdiction in
which the financial institution is located.
A.

Automatic Information Exchange Is Superior to Anonymous
Withholding

An automatic information reporting model is superior to an anonymous withholding
model in addressing the taxation of foreign financial accounts for three reasons:
1. Automatic Information Exchange Can Reach Untaxed Principal
Anonymous withholding is inferior because, unlike automatic information reporting, it
cannot address concerns regarding the accumulation of untaxed principal in a foreign
financial account. Anonymous withholding is only triggered when interest, dividends,
or capital gains are earned in a foreign account, whereas automatic information
reporting can be structured to both report on income and gains and measure the growth
of principal in a foreign account. Untaxed principal—domestic business income that
escapes taxation through the use of foreign financial accounts to engage in outright tax
fraud—is just as great of a concern for tax administrators around the world as untaxed
investment income in a foreign financial account.
2. Automatic Information Exchange Helps Maintain a Sense of
Fairness
Cross-border anonymous withholding also may damage tax morale by institutionalizing
different and preferential treatment for the most sophisticated taxpayers, as compared
to the rest of society. The more common foreign financial accounts become, the more
the special treatment of anonymous account holders could undermine other taxpayers’
sense of fairness. Furthermore, the Swiss-German anonymous withholding agreement
is explicitly conditioned on German concessions to facilitate Swiss financial
institutions’ access to German clients. The concessions Switzerland extracted from
Germany make it easier for Swiss institutions to legally compete with domestic
German financial institutions without having any local footprint and without being
subject to German regulation. As a result, more wealthy Germans may shift toward
Swiss asset management, and as more wealthy Germans avail themselves of Swiss
anonymity, other taxpayers’ sense of fairness may well decline.
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3. A Multilateral Solution Is Needed, and Multilateral Automatic
Information Exchange Is Achievable
Anonymous withholding by Switzerland alone is unlikely to substantially deter tax
evasion by German taxpayers through the use of foreign accounts. High-quality wealth
management services are available in many jurisdictions. Tax evaders can easily close
Swiss accounts and open accounts in other jurisdictions to circumvent the SwissGerman agreement. Any comprehensive solution to this tax evasion problem must
therefore involve many countries assisting Germany, and should therefore be
multilateral. 4
As the OECD has recently documented, automatic information exchange is a growing
practice, with many OECD countries sharing at least some information automatically in
order to improve global tax administration. Recent negotiations between the United
States and other countries for automatic information reporting have also accelerated
global discussions about multilateral automatic information exchange. Most notably,
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States recently
issued a model intergovernmental agreement to improve tax compliance based on
reciprocal automatic information exchange. The six countries also made a commitment
to work together to achieve common reporting and due diligence standards for financial
institutions in order to support a move to a more global system to combat tax evasion.
As matters stand today, there is a substantial opportunity internationally to build a
multilateral automatic information exchange system.
B.

Ratifying the Swiss-German Agreement Would Stifle the
Emergence of a Multilateral Automatic Information Exchange
System

A comprehensive, multilateral automatic information exchange system is less likely to
emerge if anonymous withholding is accepted as equivalent to automatic information
exchange. Bilateral anonymous withholding agreements are likely incompatible with a
comprehensive multilateral automatic information exchange system. Consistent
coercive pressure from the large, developed economies is needed to forge a working
multilateral system. Germany, and the EU as a whole, will find it much more difficult
to pressure other jurisdictions to participate in automatic information exchange once
Germany has agreed to anonymous withholding with Switzerland. This difficulty
arises both with respect to countries within the EU (such as Austria and Luxembourg)
and countries outside the EU (such as Singapore and Hong Kong). Thus, German
ratification of the Swiss agreement would make it less likely for an effective regime
that addresses the problem of tax evasion through the use of foreign accounts to take
hold worldwide. Consequently, Germany would be less able to address its own
concerns regarding tax evasion through foreign accounts, and Germany would also
make it less likely that other countries would be able to effectively address their
problems with tax evasion through foreign accounts.
1. Significance of the U.S. –Swiss Joint Statement Regarding FATCA
In June, the United States and Switzerland issued a joint statement that represents a
U.S. victory against Swiss bank secrecy. The Swiss have, in essence, agreed to provide
information automatically to the United States. The mechanism is more cumbersome
4

The most comprehensive multilateral solution to address the taxation of foreign financial accounts would involve
withholding that is not anonymous in combination with automatic information reporting. A system that provides
both withholding and reporting cross-border is, however, not currently under consideration internationally.
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than the reciprocal automatic information exchange agreement currently on the table
between Germany and the United States, but the end result is highly similar. The U.S.–
Swiss Joint Statement generally envisions direct reporting by Swiss financial
institutions to the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Accounts of
consenting U.S. accountholders would be reported to the IRS individually, while
accounts of non-consenting U.S. accountholders would be reported on an aggregate
basis. Switzerland then agreed to accept and promptly honor group information
exchange requests by the IRS for additional, individualized information about the nonconsenting U.S. account holders. In the end, the U.S. receives the same information as
it would have received under one-step automatic information exchange.
Switzerland abandoned bank secrecy in its dealings with the United States in order to
avoid the sanctions imposed by a new U.S. law (known as “FATCA”) that requires
financial institutions to report on foreign accounts held by U.S. persons. Germany is a
major economy with which Switzerland has strong ties; Germany should also have the
power to pressure Switzerland bilaterally for an arrangement that is similar to the
information reporting negotiated by the United States. Germany could also push for
coordinated defensive measures to build a multilateral automatic information exchange
system at the G-20 or lead an EU-level process to pressure Switzerland to provide
automatic information exchange to the EU.
2. Consequences of German
Withholding Agreement

Ratification

of

the

Anonymous

If Germany (and the UK) instead ratify their anonymous withholding agreements with
Switzerland, the international impact of the U.S.–Swiss agreement will be diminished.
Switzerland will have successfully defused U.S. pressure to engage in automatic
information exchange, while being able to claim that the U.S. agreement represents a
special case. If Germany ratifies its agreement with the Swiss, it will free Switzerland
to promote anonymous withholding with those few other countries that have some
leverage over the Swiss financial center and reject enhanced tax cooperation with
everyone else. This dynamic may explain why the Swiss insisted that, as part of the
Swiss-German agreement, Germany commit to not work against anonymous
withholding in dealings with third parties. 5 If governments that are committing to
increased automatic information exchange cannot coordinate with Germany to pressure
Switzerland and other asset management jurisdictions to adopt a multilateral automatic
information exchange system, then it will become difficult for the international
community to effectively pressure Switzerland and other asset management
jurisdictions to move towards a multilateral system. The absence of consistent,
coordinated pressure in one direction would harm both German tax administration and
other governments that are concerned about the global problem of tax evasion
involving the use of foreign accounts.
Madame Chairwoman and members of the Finance Committee, thank you again for
inviting me to participate in this hearing.
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See the Joint Declaration Concerning the Equivalence of this Agreement (Gemeinsame Erklärung der
Vertragstaaten zur Gleichgewichtigkeit des Abkommens).
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